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Remedies 
by Kenneth H. York* 
It is a curious circumstance that, although the sole purpose 
of a lawsuit is to obtain redress of some sort, the remedial 
aspects of cases are usually shunted to the back of the litiga-
tional bus from which they emerge belatedly, casually, and 
somewhat rumpled. Anyone searching for illuminating bits 
of remedial lore in California (or any other) advance sheets 
must be prepared to rummage about among tag-end para-
graphs of literally hundreds of civil cases from which such 
interest as may originally have existed in parties, facts, con-
troversy, strategy, or even style has long since been drained 
away. 
However, remedial considerations are sometimes so strong 
that they push to the forefront. This is particularly true of 
cases in which the claimant is afforded, or at least thinks the 
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trend of judicial lawmaking is such that there is a chance 
he may be afforded, a choice of substantive law (contract, 
tort or restitutionary) causes of action based upon the facts 
stated. 
Since remedial problems range in appearance from tag-end 
paragraphs to main themes, a discussion of court decisions is 
forced to follow a similiar pattern. It may be tempting at 
times to focus only upon the main themes, but remedial prob-
lems given lesser attention may be equally important, if only 
to the client's bank account. Accordingly, this review and 
analysis treats in varying length the remedial problems to 
which the courts gave varying attention. 
Choice of Tort or Contract-Remedial Consequences 
In California in recent years, the remedial consequences of 
being able to choose between a breach of contract or a tort ap-
proach has been most graphically presented in actions against 
insurance companies. In last year's volume of this work! 
a short review was made of those cases wherein a liability 
insurer had failed to take advantage of the opportunity to 
settle a third party claim within the policy limits, thereby 
exposing the insured to judgment liability uncovered by in-
surance. As there noted, considerable latitude is given the 
insured insofar as electing to treat the insurer's conduct as a 
breach of con tract or a tort. 2 
The lure of punitive damages undoubtedly induced the 
plaintiff in Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America3 
to add a count in tort to a complaint for damages for breach 
of a disability insurance contract. That this lure is a peculiar-
ly attractive one may be deduced from the $500,000 ex-
emplary damage award the jury added to $1,050 general 
damages. On the surface, the wrongful repudiation of a 
disability insurance contract appears to fall short of the egre-
gious conduct of the liability insurer in declining to settle 
1. See Cal Law-Trends and De- Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 
veolpmen!s 1967, at p. 285. 173 (1967). 
2. The important case, of course, is 3. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 66 764 (1968). 
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within policy limits, but the defendant insurer in Wetherbee 
made some collateral representations in writing to induce the 
insured to withdraw a letter of cancellation. From the tenor 
of these representations and the company's subsequent incon-
sistent conduct, the plaintiff was able to establish a tort (de-
ceit) theory that the company had induced the plaintiff to 
act with no intent to perform on its part. As for the $500,000 
punitive damages, the plaintiff suffered a common and ironic 
failure of too successful advocacy. The case was remanded 
for retrial because the discrepancy between general and puni-
tive damages suggested passion or prejudice. Parenthetically, 
there might be a difference between general damages recover-
able for breach of the insurance contract here and those al-
lowable in tort, but it is useless to search the case because 
counsel stipulated the same amount under either approach. 
The supreme court in Reichert v. General Insurance Com-
pany of America4 has somewhat blunted any thrust toward 
what might have seemed the ultimate holding in Wetherbee, 
that any nonperformance by an insurer could be both breach 
of contract and tort. Reichert is a peculiarly subtle case, as 
indicated by the inordinate time it was retained on the calen-
dar for rehearing, the vacation of not one but two prior 
opinions, and the obviously nonideological split in the final 
four to three decision-all this attention on whether or not 
demurrers without leave to amend were properly entered 
against a second amended complaint. The relevant facts are 
not complex. Plaintiff owned a motel allegedly valued at 
$1,500,000 with a first trust deed of $850,000. Policies with 
a combined coverage of $1,375,000 were issued by the 4 de-
fendant insurance companies. Having sustained fire loss, the 
plaintiff contended that lack of cash to meet his commitments 
caused his bankruptcy and the loss of his motel. It may be 
assumed that settlement of claims under the policies was 
eventually reached among the insurers, the beneficiary of 
the deed of trust and the trustee in bankruptcy,5 thereby dis-
4. 68 Cal.2d 822, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 5. See Kossian v. American National 
442 P.2d 377 (1968). For further dis- Insurance Co .. 254 Cal. App.2d 647, 
cussion of this case, see Seligson, IN- 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1967). 
SURANCE in this volume. 
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posing of plaintiff's claims for the insurance proceeds as such. 
Plaintiff thought, nevertheless, that his consequential pecuni-
ary injury of bankruptcy and loss of property was not ade-
quately redressed; he was confronted with the problem of 
asserting a separate personal claim that would not be included 
among those which passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. His 
first amended complaint set forth (1 ) 4 separate counts against 
the 4 insurers for return of premiums (carefully avoiding 
reference to the bankruptcy) and (2) 4 separate counts 
against the 4 insurers for failure to adjust the fire loss promptly, 
which conduct was in bad faith and constituted fraud and op-
pression resulting in bankruptcy and causing him to lose his 
motel. After demurrers were sustained, the plaintiff added a 
ninth count for bad faith against all defendants alleging that 
there was an implied promise to adjust losses promptly and 
fairly, and that contrary to such promise, settlement was not 
undertaken, and that "[a]s the direct and proximate result 
and failure to exercise . . . good faith, care, skill, or dili-
gence for the protection of plaintiff's rights, which were en-
trusted by plaintiff to defendants for protection, and of the 
defendants' breach of their trust obligations, plaintiff has 
been damaged in the amount of $1,500,000 plus interest.,,6 
It is apparent that plaintiff, by stating counts in quasi-
contract and counts for consequential damages only, con-
ceded that the claim for general damages for breach of a 
contract to pay money had passed to the trustee. It is equally 
apparent that he tried to state not only a breach of contract 
and breach of trust, but also some sort of independent, per-
sonal, non-transferable tort claim which could not be said to 
have passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Despite the further 
amendments to his complaint, the court concluded that counts 
5 through 9 were still basically contractual: 
The embellishments added by the pleader, as for example, 
that defendant "in doing all of the things as herein al-
leged, has done them deliberately, fraudulently and op-
pressively," and that defendant is "guilty of oppression 
6. 68 Cal.2d at 828, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 
323, 442 P.2d at 379. 
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and fraud," aside from their obvious conclusionary char-
acter, do not derogate from the contractual character of 
the pleading.7 
Even the dissenting judges seemed to accept this proposition 
and concentrated their attention on whether the complaint 
stated a contractual claim which escaped transfer to the trustee 
in bankruptcy. Hence, it is clear that California judges are 
presently unwilling to allow a claimant to shift from breach 
of contract to tort by mere epithets describing the quality of 
the breach. Although a man who loses property by a bank-
ruptcy traceable to a lack of funds, in turn occasioned by the 
"bad faith" and "oppressive and fraudulent" breach of a con-
tractual obligation of a fire insurer, would seemingly attract 
as much sympathy as one who loses property as the result of 
a judgment to which he is exposed by the failure of a lia-
bility insurer to pay what proves to be a valid claim, there 
is a gap between the two situations that the courts as of now 
prefer to maintain. 
Lest the point be lost, it should be restated. Reichert is a 
typical case in which the remedial desires necessarily domi-
nated and shaped the entire substantive law aspects of the case, 
rather than the contrary. 
Equitable Remedies 
In Personam Nature of Equitable Proceedings 
The proposition that "equity acts in personam," which is 
occasionally modified and sometimes derided, reasserted its 
elemental nature in Rothschild v. Erda. s The suit was in-
stituted by a special California administrator to quiet title to 
securities belonging to a decedent. Although quiet title suits 
7. 68 Cal.2d at 831, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
at 325, 442 P.2d at 381. The district 
court of appeal in one of the vacated 
opinions [53 Cal. Rptr. 693 at 699 
(1966)] put the matter this way: "Ap-
pellant apparently assumes in his argu-
ment that a contract obligation may be 
converted into a tort liability by a 
failure to perform promptly, accom-
panied by the wish to harass, vex and 
annoy the other contracting part~'. The 
great weight of authority is clearly 
against this contention." 
8. 258 Cal. App.2d 750, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
209 (1968). 
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have come to be regarded as purely in rem proceedings, the 
outcome shows that this is not literally so. In the course of the 
suit, the court issued an order granting a preliminary injunction 
restraining a New York administrator of the same estate from 
instituting in New York any proceedings relative to a claim of 
title of the securities. Substituted service was made and the 
New York administrator appeared specially. On appeal, the 
injunction order was reversed as void for want of personal ju-
risdiction, since defendant did not reside in California at any 
time as specified by Code of Civil Procedure section 417. 
Enforcement of Equitable Decrees-Remedial Problems 
T he "Void" Decree Problem 
It is easily predictable that In re Berrl will become a much 
cited opinion and will encourage collateral attacks on in-
junctive decrees. Though less predictable, it is still in the 
realm of speculation that the decision may have a considerable 
impact upon effective judicial control of group or mob (choose 
your euphemism) conduct and upon many forms of personal 
conduct over which equitable jurisdiction has of recent years 
been assumed to exist. The case developed from an ex parte 
temporary restraining order, issued at the instance of Sacra-
mento County, to prohibit a threatened strike by the Sacra-
mento Chapter of the Social Workers Union. Named were 
certain officers, 750 individual John Does and 150 John Doe 
assocIatIons. The order was issued pending a hearing on a 
motion for a preliminary injunction, and read as follows: 
That Defendants and each of them, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, representatives and members, and 
all persons in active concert or participation with 
them, or in concert among themselves, be restrained 
and enjoined from doing directly or indirectly 
by any means, method or device whatsoever any and all 
of the following things: 
9. 68 Cal.2d 137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, RELATIONS and Leahy, CONSTITUTIONAL 
436 P.2d 273 (1968). For further dis- LAW in this volume. 
clIssions of this case see Grodin, LABOR 
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a. From ordering or continuing to order, or asking or 
requesting, or otherwise inducing or attempting to in-
duce any employee of the Plaintiff to cease work for or 
not to work for the Plaintiff; 
b. From intimidating, threatening, molesting or coercing 
the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's agents, employees, suppliers, 
contractors, guests or invitees; 
c. From striking or engaging in a work stoppage or 
other similar concerted activity against Plaintiff; and 
d. From picketing, and from placing, stationing or main-
taining, or causing any picket or pickets to be stationed 
or maintained, and from causing, participating in or in-
ducing others to participate in any demonstration or 
demonstrations on any grounds, or that portion of any 
private or public street which adjoins any grounds, or on 
any sidewalk which is contiguous to any portion of any 
private or public street which adjoins any grounds which 
are owned, possessed or controlled by the Plaintiff and 
on which are situated any building, buildings or structures 
of any kind whatsoever which are occupied by Plaintiff 
and in which employees of Plaintiff are assigned to 
work.lo 
Union attorneys counseled that the order suffered from con-
stitutional defects and a strike with peaceful picketing began. 
No attempt was made to obtain a modification of the t.r.o. 
Arrests were made and charges of criminal contempt under 
Penal Code section 166 (4) were filed against the petitioners 
who were later released on bail pending trial. Thus a col-
lateral rather than a direct attack was made on the order by 
means of a writ of habeas corpus. The supreme court dis-
cerned numerous constitutional objections to the t.r.o., de-
clared it void, and sustained the writ as a proper remedy for 
attack, using the analogy that "a court is without jurisdiction 
to subject a citizen to criminal prosecution for violation of an 
unconstitutional state or ordinance."ll 
10. 68 Cal.2d at 141-142, 65 Cal. 11. 68 Cal.2d at 145, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 276-277, 436 P.2d at 276-277. at 279, 436 P.2d at 279. 
CAL LAW 1969 4:3 
7
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Remedies 
The basic proposition of the court that the deliberate vio-
lation of an equity decree, void on its face, will not subject 
the violator to penalties for civil or criminal contempt is an 
entirely acceptable rule as such. However, there may be 
some element of overkill, because the way the conclusion was 
reached could have a considerable bearing upon the effective-
ness of injunctive remedies in California. Only a few of the 
possible points for discussion will be here taken up. 
In the first place, the opinion in Berry recognizes the dis-
tinction between void decrees and merely erroneous decrees, 
which cannot be disregarded with impunity, pending a re-
view to detect the error which is ultimately shown to appear. 
Void decrees have commonly been regarded as those beyond 
the power or primary jurisdiction of the court to enter because 
of lack of jurisdiction over the parties or of the subject matter. 
The problem of an occasional, flagrantly erroneous decree has 
been resolved by simply allowing a collateral challenge be-
cause the decree grossly exceeds the court's equitable juris-
diction. Perhaps this standard approach would have dealt 
adequately with t.r.o. in Berry-either on the assumption 
that the subject matter jurisdiction of a trial court does not 
extend to the issuance of decrees constitutionally invalid on 
their face, or that at least such decrees are patently and grossly 
in excess of equitable jurisdiction. In its desire to hold the 
instant decree void, however, the supreme court chose to re-
iterate a previous holding which narrowed the concept of the 
court's power (i.e., primary jurisdiction): 
Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined 
power of a court in any instance, whether that power be 
defined by constitutional provision, express statutory 
declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed 
under the doctrine stare decisis, are in excess of juris-
diction. 12 
From the sense in which "jurisdiction" is used in the quota-
tion, the concept expressed comes perilously close to running 
12. Abelleira v. District Court of Ap- at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 280, 436 P.2d 
peal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 132 at 280. 
A.L.R. 715 (1941). cited in 68 Cal.2d 
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counter to the rule that erroneous decrees are not void. A 
decree constitutionally objectionable on its face fits easily 
within such a concept of want of power, but the concept would 
unwisely characterize as void the inordinate number of Cali-
fornia trial decisions that suspiciously depart from precedent. 
Moreover, the posture of the supreme court that a departure 
from "rules developed by the courts and followed under the 
doctrine of stare decisis" exceeds jurisdiction and is thus void 
may strike some of the legal profession as whimsical. 
On a related "jurisdictional" point the opinion may have 
gone further than necessary. The county advanced an argu-
ment based upon United States v. United Mine Workers/3 that 
the superior court had the power to issue an order preserving 
the status quo "while . . . in the process of determining the 
substantial question of its authority to grant the injunctive 
relief sought, and that the temporary restraining order, as ex-
pression of that power, was to be obeyed upon pain of con-
tempt regardless of its constitutional validity as ultimately 
determined."14 This argument seems amiss here because the 
United Mine Workers' doctrine may be properly limited to 
the situation where a court is recognized to have the power to 
issue an injunction maintaining the status quo while it ascer-
tains facts to determine whether the case is properly before it 
(the familiar "jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction"). 
Since the attack on the order in In re Berry was upon the con-
stitutional deficiency of its language, the question of invalidity 
was entirely different. The opinion quite correctly dis-
tinguished the case of Signal Oil, etc. Co. v. Ashland Oil, etc. 
Co. IS (which to some extent relied on United Mine Workers), 
sustaining the power of a superior court to issue a t.r.o. that 
enjoins acts in violation of an agreement subsequently held 
to be void. 
In view of the distinctions between Berry and United Mine 
Workers, the Berry opinion's inclusion of a quotation from 
Witkin regarding United Mine Workers-"Whatever be the 
13. 330 U.S. 258, 91 L.Ed. 884, 67 14. 68 Cal.2d at 146, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
S.Ct. 677 (1947). at 279-280, 436 P.2d at 279-280. 
15. 49 Cal.2d 764, 322 P.2d 1 (1958). 
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extent to which federal courts apply this doctrine, it is not the 
law in California"16-is gratuitous and may someday give rea-
son for regret (particularly since the cases cited by Witkin 
as authority do not bear directly on the point of United Mine 
Workers). 
The justification for the United M ine Workers' approach is 
that it allows a court effectively to maintain the status quo 
during a transitory phase of litigation and thus permits it to 
handle in an orderly fashion genuine controversies over its 
power, regardless of the ultimate decision. The point of 
United M ine Workers is that orders issued for this purpose 
are within the power of the court and are not void, at least in 
respect to a citation for criminal contempt. It is wide of the 
mark to assume that a compilation of quotes to the effect that 
a violation of a void order will not support a contempt citation 
somehow establishes a clear-cut rule in California contrary 
to United Mine Workers. 
There is indeed a recent case in California cited in neither 
Berry nor by Witkin, that appears to conflict with the United 
Mine Workers' approach. In First National Bank v. Superior 
Court17 the court issued a t.r.o. against a bank, enjoining it 
from holding a sale under a deed of trust. The bank requested 
dissolution of the order a short time before the scheduled 
hour of sale. The court asked for a postponement of the sale to 
allow it to dispose of other matters and review the bank's 
authorities. The bank declined and the court refused to dis-
solve the order. After the sale the court held the bank in con-
tempt and assessed a fine of $500. The appellate court an-
nulled the fine because of a federal statute that "no injunction 
shall be issued against a (national banking association) 
. . . before final judgment in any . . . action . . . in 
any state court.,,18 The appellate court said that 
since the order must fall, all contempt proceedings based on 
its violation must fall with it. That the court was unhappy 
16. 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954), Rptr. 358 (1966) cert. den. 385 U.S. 
p. 421. 829, 17 L.Ed.2d 65, 87 S.C!. 65. 
17. 240 Cal. App.2d 109, 49 Cal. 18. 12 U.S.c.A. § 91. 
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with this course of events is made plain by the following 
language: 
This decision is in no way critical of the trial judge. The 
rule [federal statute] is little known in the California 
practice and seems seldom resorted to by the many na-
tional banks of this state. It is difficult to understand 
counsel's rejection of the judge's eminently reasonable 
request for a two-hour postponement of sale to permit 
review of petitioner's authorities. We are bound, how-
ever, by the federal statute barring interim injunctive 
relief in all state courtS.19 
There should be no inference that the appellate court was 
consciously running counter to the United Mine Workers' 
rationale, for it cited no authority whatsoever. In fact, the 
policy reasons underlying United Mine Workers are not strong-
ly presented here. Even in such a weak case, it obviously 
struck the appellate court as not entirely fit that the order 
of a trial judge to hold it a minute while he reads the book 
should be void even though he reads the book accurately and 
correctly concludes he is not empowered to proceed further. 
Had there been a genuine dispute as to whether the bank 
was a "national" bank or whether there was a "final" judg-
ment, the problem in First National would have been much 
closer to United Mine Workers. 
The power to decide such underlying issues and to issue 
orders maintaining the status quo on pain of contempt, while 
they are being decided, should rest squarely on the necessity 
for a responsible, effective, and fast litigational process, rather 
than on "jurisdictional" irrelevancies. 
As a matter of fact, the United Mine Workers' situation has 
not really arisen in California; nor has its rationale been ex-
amined in the proper context. Until this happens it may be 
advisable to downplay some recent dicta and consider the 
question as still open. The power involved is inherently pro-
19. 240 Cal. App.2d at 111, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. at 360. 
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cedural-to be neither casually exercised nor casually re-
jected. 
Turning now to the fundamental issue decided in In re 
Berry, it must be noted that the supreme court assumed, at 
least for purposes of the decision, that certain strike activities 
by welfare workers could be properly enjoined, but neverthe-
less held the recited order, in each of its subparts, was in-
fected with constitutional deficiencies-violation of First 
Amendment guaranties, vagueness, and overbreadth-so per·· 
vasive as to preclude the application of the doctrine of severa-
bility. 
When injunction decrees infringe First Amendment rights 
alone, they might be salvaged by the device of a partial 
supersedeas.20 (In this situation appeal is not available in-
California.) Tests of unconstitutional vagueness and over-
breadth, which have been applied to legislation and now apply 
to certain equity decrees in California, create drafting prob-
lems of a broad dimension. Since a party is now permitted 
collaterally to attack without taking steps directly to seek a 
modification, it is impossible, as might be the case with a 
state statute, to obtain a properly limiting interpretation ren-
dering the decree constitutional. The problem of uncertainty, 
apart from constitutional considerations, has always been a 
major one, particularly in connection with mandatory ele-
ments in a decree. Now, even in negative decrees, as in 
Berry, the drafter must keep an eye on a voluminous amount 
of constitutional law cases involving statutes and ordinances. 
He must do this with considerable attentiveness when handling 
cases of personal and civil rights, cases with fluid situations, 
and cases affected by considerable emotion. He must define 
with specificity, but avoid overbreadth. He gets but one 
chance. If he is wrong, the attempt is a nullity, and conduct 
in defiance of the defective order escapes punishment, even 
though properly controllable and obviously within the gen-
erally proscribed area. 
Given these considerations, there may be greater hesitancy 
20. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. visors, 255 Cal. App.2d 51, 62 Cal. 
Sacramento County Board of Super- Rptr. 819 (1967). 
48 CAL LAW 1969 
12
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/5
Remedies 
to issue equity decrees in cases involving civil rights and per-
sonal conduct. It is a reminder that there is a residual 
validity to equity's traditional hesitancy to depart from the 
protection of only property rights-not because there might 
be a deficiency in humaneness, but because the harsh equi-
table remedies are peculiarly unsuited to the detailed regula-
tion of personal conduct among human beings. 
Contempt-Civil or Criminal-Jury Trials 
The distinction between civil and criminal contempts, 
puzzling at best, is further obscured in California by reason 
of statute. Contempt proceedings in this state may be pursu-
ant to the Penal Code as in Berry or to the Code of Civil 
Procedure sections 1209-1222. Section 1209 lists eleven acts 
or omissions constituting contempt, ignores any traditional 
classifications, and indiscriminately lumps violations of equity 
decrees (civil contempt) with aberrant behavior in and out 
of court. Section 1219 allows imprisonment for the omission 
to perform an act which is still within one's power to perform, 
thus providing for the usual method of civil contempt of 
the disobedience of mandatory equity decrees. Otherwise 
the procedure and penalties for all forms of contempt, under 
the Code of Civil Procedure sections, including the disobedi-
ence of negative injunctions, are the same. 
In a leading case,I the supreme court said: 
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is 
important in the federal and some state courts because 
there are procedural differences, particularly in the safe-
guards afforded the citee [citation omitted] 
. But in California the proceedings leading to 
punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal con-
tempt) and to imprisonment until the omitted act is 
performed (civil contempt) are exactly the same [cita-
tion omitted]. Although the sections which provide the 
procedure for both kinds of contempt are in Part III 
1. City of Culver City v. Superior 
Court, 38 Ca1.2d 535, 241 P.2d 258 
(1952). 
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of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is entitled "Special 
Proceedings of a Civil Nature," contempt proceedings 
are said to be "criminal in nature" and those procedural 
rights and safeguards which are appropriate to criminal 
contempt proceedings are also afforded, in California, 
to civil contempt proceedings.2 
Relying on the foregoing, the court of appeals, second district, 
division three, in Little v. Superior Court3 annulled an order 
adjudging a defendant in contempt for failure to obey a court 
directive to sign consent to certain depositions. Conducting 
the review (on certiorari) as though criminal procedural safe-
guards were required, the court found deficiencies as to speci-
ficity, intent, and quantum of proof. 
Against this background one would expect a jury trial in 
all contempt cases in this state, but two cases have held other-
wise. In United Farm Workers Org. Comm. AFL-CIO V. 
Superior Court,4 the defendants violated a negative injunction 
with respect to picketing and were ordered to show cause 
why they should not be held in contempt. The court of appeal, 
fifth district, refused a writ of prohibition to prevent the hear-
ing from proceeding without a jury. Citing three recent United 
States Supreme Court decisions,5 the court held that the viola-
tion was civil, not criminal, and that no jury trial was con-
stitutionally required. 
A few days later in a routine civil case concerning a viola-
tion of a preliminary injunction,6 the court of appeal, second 
district, third division (which decided the Little case, supra) 
also cited the same three Supreme Court decisions and also 
held there is no right to a jury trial in proceedings under Code 
of Civil Procedure sections 1209-1222, but on the ground 
2. 38 Cal.2d at 541, 241 P.2d at 261. 
3. 260 Cal. App.2d 311, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
77 (1968). 
4. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
513 (1968). 
5. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 88 S.Ct. 1444 
50 CAL LAW 1969 
(1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 
20 L.Ed.2d 522, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (1968); 
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 
391 U.S. 216, 20 L.Ed.2d. 538, 88 S.Ct. 
1472 (1968). 
6. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Su-
periorCourt, 265 Cal. App.2d -, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 177 (1968). 
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that the penalties imposed were so limited that the contempt 
charged fell within the category of a petty offense. 
Thus we can say that a defendant who violates an equity 
decree in California is probably not entitled to a jury trial 
if cited for contempt under sections 1209-1222, but we can-
not yet with authority say why. In a sense, both appellate 
courts are correct in their interpretation of the Supreme Court 
decisions. The fifth district opinion is correct in saying that 
those decisions held that no jury trial is constitutionally re-
quired for civil contempt and correct in saying that its case 
is civil contempt as most courts (apart from California) would 
view it. The second district opinion is correct in saying that 
the Supreme Court cases hold that the Constitution does not 
require a jury trial for petty criminal contempt cases, and the 
opinion is therefore consistent with its view of California 
precedent. 
Support Orders-Contempt 
Under merged procedure, equity decrees for the payment of 
money are enforceable both through contempt (within limi-
tations as to imprisonment for debt) and through means used 
to collect ordinary legal judgments. Support orders are in-
stances in point. In Lyon v. Superior Court,7 the supreme 
court disagreed with the court of appeal and upheld a contempt 
order against a father in arrears in his support payments. The 
trial court's finding of an ability to pay, at least in part, was 
considered enough to sustain the order: "Ability to comply 
with an order does not necessarily mean the ability to fully 
and completely comply."g The order in question did, how-
ever, contain a peculiar provision: 
The Defendant, having been found guilty of contempt 
of court on six counts . . . is hereby ordered to serve 
five days in the County Jail on each count to run con-
secutively. The Court further orders that this contempt 
7. 68 Cal.2d 446, 67 Cal. Rptr. 265, 95 N.W.2d 533 (1959), cited in 68 Cal. 
439 P.2d 1 (1968). 2d at 451, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 268, 439 
8. Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.Dak. 546, P.2d at 4. 
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may be paid [italics added] by the payment of $100.00 
for each five days to be served.9 
The court of appeal, which found the order in general to 
be void for uncertainty, considered this provision to be mean-
ingless, providing neither punishment under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1218 nor coercion under section 1219.10 
The supreme court, however, gave meaning to the section by 
interpreting the paid to mean "purged." Neither section 1218 
nor section 1219 applies to the conditions whereby the defend-
ant may purge himself of contempt. 
In two other casesll involving child support orders the 
supreme court emphasized that, beyond contempt proceed-
ings, no special advantages would accompany this type of 
equity decree in California. Both cases derived from attempts, 
in effect, to garnish county or city pension moneys due the 
jUdgment debtors as retired employees, but the court held 
that such funds were by statute exempt from execution, gar-
nishment, attachment or other process of court without any 
equitable exceptions as to child support decrees. In fact the 
court in one case felt so strongly about it that it held the 
trial court had no power to issue the order and allowed the 
peremptory writ of mandamus in lieu of appeal.12 
Equity Power-Setting Aside Default Judgments 
Conflicting opinions were written by the second and fifth 
district courts of appeal as to whether the municipal court 
has the power to set aside a default judgment because of 
extrinsic fraud or mistake upon a motion made six months 
after the default. According to the fifth district opinion,13 a 
separate equity suit in the superior court is required. The 
9. 68 Cal.2d at 449, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 
267, 439 P.2d at 3. 
10. See Lyon v. Superior Court, 64 
Cal. Rptr. 357 (1967). 
11. Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal.2d 7, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 579, 442 P.2d 659 (1968); 
Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 14, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 583, 442 P.2d 663 (1968). 
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12. Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 
2d 14. 69 Cal. Rptr. 583. 442 P.2d 663 
(1968). 
13. Strachan v. American Insurance 
Co., 260 Cal. App.2d 113, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
742 (1968). 
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second district in a later case14 pointedly disagreed. The 
supreme court, however, ultimately has sided with the fifth 
district position. 
Default judgments in the superior court entered under the 
same circumstances may be alternatively attacked by motionI5 
or by a separate suit in equity.16 The relief granted by way 
of motion has usually been justified as within the "inherent 
equity power" of the superior court. There has been little 
question that default judgments entered in the municipal court 
may be avoided for extrinsic fraud or mistake in a separate 
equity suit filed in the superior court.17 But does the munic-
ipal court have the power to accomplish the same result by 
motion? The Strachan case (5th district) held no, because 
the equitable relief requested was not within the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction (power) of the municipal court as outlined in 
section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although it was 
conceded that otherwise the matter was one which could be 
practically handled by the municipal court. The Bloniarz 
case (2d district), after noting the incongruity which arises 
if in matters over $5000 relief from default may be had by 
motion, but for matters less than $5000 a separate suit in 
equity in a different court is required, held that the municipal 
court has the inherent power to settle the matter on a motion 
to set aside the default, even after a six-month lapse. 
The difficulty arises from a language trap. The superior 
court's power to set aside defaults on motion has been habit-
ually described as an "inherent equity power." To confer 
the same power by court decision on the municipal court 
does indeed seem to be a judicial extension of its subject 
14. Bloniarz v. Roloson, 263 A.C.A. 
139.69 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1968). (Opinion 
later vacated, see 70 Cal.2d -, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 285, 449 P.2d 221 (1969).) 
15. E.g., Palmer v. Moore, 266 Cal. 
App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1968); 
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 256 Cal. App.2d 
301, 64 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1967); Orange 
Empire National Bank v. Kirk, 259 
Cal. App.2d 347, 66 Cal. Rptr. 240 
(1968) (attorney's misconduct rather 
than fraud or mistake). 
16. E.g., Higley v. Bank of Downey, 
260 Cal. App.2d 640, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
365 (1968); Hayes v. Rich, 255 Cal. 
App.2d 613, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1967) 
(this opinion states the attack is direct, 
although in fact it should probably be 
called collateral). 
17. See Bernath v. Wilson, 149 Cal. 
App.2d 831, 309 P.2d 87 (1957). 
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matter jurisdiction relative to equity causes beyond that al-
lowed by the legislature. The court of appeal's opinion in 
Bloniarz need not, however, be so interpreted. The power 
to avoid its own default judgments at any time for fraud or 
mistake, provided there is a proper hearing, can be regarded 
as inherent without necessarily saying it is equitable-gov-
erned by equitable principles, yes. 
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeal in 
B loniarz18 (as well as with the comments which have just been 
made), stating that the power to set aside a default judg-
ment for extrinsic fraud or mistake is "distinct from the 
power to amend and correct records"19 as conferred on all 
courts by Code of Civil Procedure section 128. According 
to the court, the first power is equitable and inheres in only 
courts of general jurisdiction; the second power is primarily 
administrative and inheres in all courts of record. 
It is arguable that the inherent power of a municipal court 
is controlled solely by section 128. That section merely de-
fines a court's incidental powers. The power to set aside a 
default judgment inheres in the powers conferred on the 
municipal court by section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
To resolve the conflicting interpretations in favor of a munic-
ipal court exercising such a power, an amendment to section 
89 should be made. 
Ancillary Equitable Remedies-Maintaining Litigational 
Status Quo 
The usual diverse problems in framing suitable temporary 
orders of a discretionary nature were encountered in 1968 
with no striking developments. In Continental Baking Co. 
v. KatlO a temporary injunction against interfering with an 
easement came under scrutiny. Although it appeared that 
some documentary evidence had been improperly admitted, 
the supreme court sustained the injunction. The exclusion 
18. 70 Cal.2d -,74 Cal. Rptr. 285, 20. 68 Cal.2d 512, 67 Cal. Rptr. 761, 
449 P.2d 221 (1968). 439 P.2d 889 (1968). 
19. 70 Cal.2d at -, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 
288, 449 P.2d at 224. 
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of such evidence may have weakened the probability of the 
plaintiff's ultimate success, but the issue of relative hardship, 
weighted in plaintiff's favor, was not affected. 
That the court may be in for a lengthy period of supervision 
of temporary injunctions where personality factors dominate 
litigation was again illustrated in Jones v. Fakehany.l Dr. 
Fakehany founded the Highland Medical Clinic a quarter of 
a century ago. His death triggered a dispute between his 
widow and his former medical associate, who instituted pro-
ceedings in 1966 for liquidation of their partnership. Skir-
mishes for physical control of the premises, for the possession 
of records, and for the clinic's patients led to a series of 
court orders attempting to keep this knotty complex of prob-
lems beyond disentanglement. Two years later the court 
of appeal in the cited case was called upon to consider modi-
fication of an order containing several directives. The court 
deemed it inadvisable to formulate a "final" order even after 
this length of time, gave some sage advice, and remanded 
with directions to modify pursuant to the advice. 
The difference between a conservatorship and a receivership 
was stated as follows in Hillman v. Stults,2 wherein a convict 
sought protection of his property: "A receiver is a neutral 
court official while a conservator is a representative of a 
party."3 Since an equity court has inherent power to appoint 
a receiver, it may, when proper, do so without duplication, 
in a case where a conservatorship exists. Although it men-
tioned a trial of title, the court held that the case was basically 
no more than an equity suit to establish and enforce an ex-
press trust, so no right to a jury trial existed. 
Declaratory Judgments 
Last year's article on remedies demonstrated that the declar-
atory judgment as a test for the constitutionality of penal 
ordinances is often treated erratically by the courts. One 
1. 261 Cal. App.2d 298, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3. 263 Cal. App.2d at 875, 70 Cal. 
810 (1968). R ptf. at 31 I. 
2. 263 Cal. App.2d 848. 70 Cal. Rptr. 
295 (1968). 
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justification for such treatment was offered this year by Holden 
v. Arnebergh.4 
Plaintiffs, in the business of selling books, were arrested for 
selling obscene material. They brought an action for declara-
tory relief and for an injunction against the city attorney. 
The trial court sustained demurrers to the plaintiff's complaint. 
The court of appeal, second district, affirmed the judgment 
on the pleading. 
Plaintiff advanced two arguments on appeal: (1) that the 
officers were required to obtain warrants prior to the arrest 
and seizure and (2) that "it is now settled that an action 
for declaratory judgment will lie to determine the alleged 
obscenity of a book or other material."5 The court rejected 
the first argument on the ground that the plaintiffs had an 
adequate remedy at law by virtue of sections 1539 and 1540 
of the Penal Code. That there was an adequate remedy at 
law also met the plaintiff's second contention-this time, by 
virtue of a timely motion to suppress that "might well have 
removed the several materials from judicial consideration, 
thus ending the People's case."6 
Contrasted to Holden is Landau v. Fording,7 in which the 
court of appeal, first district, assumed the plaintiffs had access 
to declaratory relief, although it did decide that the material 
was obscene and thus denied relief. But Holden is distinguish-
able from Landau in that the plaintiff in Landau had not been 
arrested prior to bringing the action. This distinction justifi-
ably controlled the different results in the two cases. 
Remedies for Injuries to Tangible Property Interests8 
Real Property-Remedies to Determine Title or Pos-
session 
A quiet title suit, being equitable, is subject to the defense 
4. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 41 Cal. Rptr. 
40 I (1968). 
5. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. at 403. 
6. 265 Cal. App.2d at -, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. at 404. 
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7. 245 Cal. App.2d 820, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 177 (1966), affirmed memo-
randum, 388 U.S. 456, 18 L.Ed.2d 1317, 
87 S.C!. 2109 (1967). 
8. Heretofore discussion has been 
primarily limited to procedural consid-
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of laches, but the very nature of the suit, i.e., to obtain a 
declaration of status, makes the defense rarely applicable. As 
pointed out in Gerhard v. Stephens9 the party asserting the 
defense must demonstrate that he was in adverse possession 
of the contested property during the period of delay. 
Recovery of possession by a landlord generally takes the 
form of summary proceedings in unlawful detainer. Statu-
tory treble damages totaling $32,000, plus attorney's fees 
(as provided under the lease) were awarded in Erbe Corp. 
v. W & B Realty Co. 10 despite the unusual fact that the 
defendants had relinquished physical possession before trial, 
without conceding their lack of right to possession. 
-Damages for Trespass 
Confusion exists about the meaning of the expression "miti-
gation of damages" because of the tendency to use it to 
describe disparate concepts and also to speak unnecessarily 
of a "duty" to mitigate. The defendant in a defamation case, 
for example, may "mitigate" damages by publishing a retrac-
tion. The same defendant might also seek to introduce evi-
dence in "mitigation" by showing the plaintiff had no reputa-
tion to destroy. The plaintiff cannot recover for damages 
which he could reasonably limit, and this too is referred to 
as "mitigation," although it can be more cogently described 
as "the doctrine of avoidable consequences." 
There is some discussion on this point in Green v. Smith;l1 
the court made unmistakably clear the nature and application 
of the avoidable consequences rule, even though it did lapse 
into using the broad term "mitigation." In Green the defend-
ant intentionally (but not maliciously) broke a concrete irri-
gation pipeline supplying plaintiff's nursery for ornamental 
trees which were approaching harvest. Plaintiff attempted 
erations in pursuit of the proper rem-
edy. The article now turns to a dis-
cussion of remedies in context of sub-
stantive law. 
9. 68 Cal.2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 
442 P.2d 692 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Friedenthal, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE in this volume. 
10. 255 Cal. App.2d 773, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 462 (1967). 
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 392, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 796 (1968). 
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to irrigate by constructing ditches; his first attempt failed and 
the second saved nineteen rows of trees. Twenty-five rows, 
worth $17,000, were lost. In a nonjury trial it was found 
that by expending $600 plaintiff could have brought in water 
by renting portable equipment or by running a line to a fire 
hydrant. Hence, damages were held limited to $600. The 
appellate court reversed on the matter of damages. The 
plaintiff, of course, could not recover damages he could rea-
sonably have avoided by an expenditure not "disproportionate 
to the loss sought to be avoided."12 At first glance, an 
expenditure of $600 to save $17 ,000 would not seem dis-
proportionate or unreasonable. However, the appellate court 
correctly pointed out that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's 
actions is not to be judged by hindsight or by standards appli-
cable to a genuine "duty" which might be invoked in other 
areas of the law. Confronted with an emergency, the plaintiff 
took measures to avoid the consequences of defendant's inten-
tional wrong. That other measures would later seem more 
rational does not control the reasonableness of conduct which 
satisfies the legal requirements of "avoidance of consequences." 
- Encroachments and Nuisances 
The legal remedy of self help plus damages was held prefer-
able to the equitable mandatory injunction in a somewhat 
unusual encroachment case, City of Berkeley v. Gordon. ls 
The city, while reconstructing a street, encountered a base-
ment built 65 years previously, extending from defendant's 
building into the street area. Since there was no impairment 
of normal street usage, and there was an inference of consent 
by the city, the basement was held to be merely an encroach-
ment rather than a public nuisance, abatable under California 
Civil Code section 3491. Although other factors also justi-
fied the discretionary denial of equitable relief in favor of 
damages, the fact that the plaintiff had the requisite equipment 
on the site, plus the difficulties inherent in supervising manda-
tory construction decrees, alone warranted the denial. 
12. 261 Cal. App.2d at 396, 67 Cal. 13. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. at 800. 716 (1968). 
58 CAL LAW 1969 
22
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/5
Remedies 
A court that has undertaken equitable control of a public 
nuisance may properly issue injunctions against the bringing 
of further private nuisance suits to prevent impairment of its 
orders and to avoid conflicting regulations and vexatious liti-
gation. So held Rynsburger v. Fertilizer Co-op, Inc.14 Such 
an injunction is no more than a modern example of the his-
toric equity bill of peace. A side issue of laches was raised 
in Rynsburger because the private suit had been allowed to 
proceed to the point where a trial date had been set before 
the injunction was sought; but the defense was rejected 
on the ground that the delay was insignificant in point of 
time. 
Competition between two adjacent enterprises offering food, 
drink, gas, etc. along a frontage road to Highway 99 in Tulare 
County had escalated to the point of erection of spite fences, 
diversionary road signs, and other harassing devices, and the 
court held such activities to be a nuisance warranting an 
injunction, plus damages reflected by loss of profits in Hutch-
erson v. Alexander.15 Since both plaintiff's and defendant's 
businesses were relatively new and had been established within 
a few weeks of each other, the problem of determining lost 
profits was, as is frequently the case/6 a difficult one. The 
trial court adopted the device of issuing the injunction and 
then retaining jurisdiction to determine damages based on 
further experience in the operation of the business. The 
appellate court, however, disapproved of this remedial tech-
nique. While agreeing that an equity court after issuing an 
injunction may retain jurisdiction to later modify the decree, 
it held that in bifurcated cases, the damage issue should not 
be similarly held back pending developments. If the deter-
mination of lost profits at trial is merely difficult, the court 
should do the best it can; if too speculative, the court should 
award only nominal damages. 
14. 266 Cal. App.2d -, 72 Cal. Rptr. 16. The problem is more frequently 
102 (1968). presented in breach of contract cases. 
15. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Rptr. Cf. cases cited infra under the subhead-
366 (1968). ing Contracts for the Sale of Chattels-
Damages-Lost Profits. 
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Personal Property-Specific Restitution 
Claim and delivery is a statutory provisional remedy invo-
cable when chattels are wrongfully withheld. A procedural 
point was clarified as to this remedy in American Machine 
& Foundry Co. v. Pitchess. 17 Code of Civil Procedure section 
509 allows the plaintiff (subject to procedures not here rel-
evant) "at any time before answer, to claim the delivery" of 
his property (emphasis added). The plaintiff had delivered 
the necessary papers to the sheriff, but the sheriff had not 
picked up the property before the defendant filed an answer. 
The court held that plaintiff had "claimed" the property with-
in the meaning of the statute and issued a mandamus to the 
sheriff. 
Excessive Attachments of Property-Abuse of Process 
and Malicious Prosecution-Measure of Damages 
In Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co.IS the 
defendant attached a flock of turkeys in the possession of a 
grower purportedly by virtue of rights to after-acquired prop-
erty under a chattel mortgage. The turkeys were actually 
the property of the plaintiff under separate financing arrange-
ments. To secure the release of the turkeys, plaintiff paid 
$60,738.56, the amount of the grower's debt to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff filed a tort claim for abuse of process, and added 
a common count in assumpsit that indicated a remedial theory 
of legal restitution of moneys paid under duress. (The court 
of appeal properly rejected the ancient contention that the 
addition of an assumpsit count "waived" the other counts 
in the complaint.) The plaintiff requested submission of a 
punitive damages issue to the jury, but the trial court refused 
the request. However, an issue of mental anguish was al-
lowed to go to the jury, which then returned a verdict of 
nearly $111,000. The trial court thereafter issued a condi-
17. 262 Cal. App.2d 490, 68 Cal. (1968). Reference is made in the dis-
Rptr. 814 (1968). cussion to both the prevailing and the 
18. 62 CaL Rptr. 169 (1967) a court vacated opinions in order to present the 
of appeal opinion vacated by 69 Cal.2d handling of the damages issues more 
-, 72 CaL Rptr. 344, 446 P.2d 152 clearly. 
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tional order for a new trial unless plaintiff consented to a 
reduction to $67,000. The plaintiff consented and defendant 
appealed. 
At this point the judgment still included an item of 
$6,261.44 more than out-of-pocket expenditures that could be 
attributed to only mental anguish. But both the supreme court 
and the court of appeal pointed out that the plaintiff as a 
corporation could not sustain mental anguish. At the same 
time, both agreed that it was erroneous to exclude the issue 
of punitive damages from the jury. Nevertheless, by electing 
to accept $67,000 the plaintiff had arguably foregone an 
award of punitive damages. Should the case be uncondition-
ally remanded for a new trial on the damage issue? The 
court of appeal decided remand unnecessary if defendant 
would consent to the judgment for $67,000. Otherwise, a 
new trial would be ordered on all amounts above $60,738.56, 
and the defendant would assume the risk of having the puni-
tive damage issue submitted to the jury. The supreme court, 
allowing the defendant no such option, reversed for a new 
trial on the entire damage issue, both compensatory and 
punitive, and vacated the intermediate court's opinion. 
A side issue in Templeton Feed relates to the effect of 
plaintiff acting on advice of counsel. It was noted in the 
court of appeal opinion that outside of California this point 
has been considered as evidence in mitigation of damages, 
but not as a defense to the action. In California the point 
arose in a malicious prosecution case19 where action on advice 
of counsel was held to be a defense to the action as long 
as all facts are fully disclosed to the attorney. Assuming, 
without deciding, that this holding applies to abuse of process, 
the court in Templeton disposed of the problem by simply 
observing that the record did not sustain the defense as stated. 
There the matter rests. 
The use of the declaratory relief technique in an action 
for malicious prosecution is hardly to be expected, but this 
remedy was appropriately applied in Munson v. Linnick.20 
19. Moore v. Durrer, 127 Cal. App. 20. 255 Cal. App.2d 589, 63 Cal. 
759, 16 P.2d 676 (1932). Rptr. 340 (1967). 
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One substantive requirement for this tort is the termination 
of the so-called "prosecution" favorable to the person later 
seeking redress. In the Munson case, part of the pattern of 
malicious prosecution charged against defendant, a lawyer, 
was the violation of a tacit agreement with opposing counsel 
not to take a default in the highly questionable action that 
he, the defendant, had initiated. Defendant, however, not 
only caused a default to be entered, but also allowed a year 
to pass before taking action to enforce the judgment, thus 
precluding a motion to set aside under section 473 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. Levy and execution on the plain-
tiff's property was then obtained. 
Plaintiff filed the present action to set aside the default 
judgment, to recover the proceeds of the levy plus punitive 
damages, and to obtain a declaration of rights in the premises. 
Treated as an action for malicious prosecution, the point was 
made that, at the time the suit for declaratory relief was filed, 
the default judgment was technically still in effect, so the 
"prosecution" could not be said to have yet ended favorably 
to the plaintiff. The declaratory judgment suit, however, is 
equitable in nature and a court of equity can make a com-
plete determination of the controversy according to the facts 
as they exist at the time of the decree. An award composed 
of the amount taken under the wrongful judgment plus inter-
est, expenses, and punitive damages, may properly be made 
as an incident of the declaratory relief action. 
The remedy for excessive attachment where the underlying 
proceedings are valid is an action for abuse of process rather 
than an action for malicious prosecution, which is proper when 
the attachment is pursuant to an underlying action maliciously 
instituted without proper cause. So held the supreme court 
in White Lighting v. Wolfson. 1 In the normal situation, 
therefore, the claim arising from excessive attachment may 
be asserted in the primary action itself. 
1. 68 Cal.2d 336, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
438 P.2d 345 (1968). 
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Money-Diversion of Proceeds of Insurance Policies 
In Cramer v. Biddison2 the court of appeal in a two-to-one 
decision found appropriate grounds for a constructive trust 
on insurance proceeds, but then proceeded to nullify the prac-
tical reasons for doing so. As part of a divorce settlement, 
the husband had agreed to carry insurance policies amounting 
to $45,000 payable to the wife but specifically for the protec-
tion of the children during minority. The husband, without 
the wife's knowledge or consent, had changed the beneficiary 
on all but $12,000 of the policies to his estate. He died before 
the children reached majority. The executors received the 
moneys, and after receiving notice of the wife's claim under 
the contract paid creditors' claims with the proceeds. In 
this suit by the wife against the executors, the majority rec-
ognized the propriety of a constructive trust amounting to 
$3,000 and conceded the rule that property not properly 
part of the decedent's estate should not be applied to the 
decedent's debts. However, the majority thought the exec-
utors could, with impunity, treat the alleged trust funds as 
an asset until judicially determined otherwise. Their con-
clusion seems contrary to comment (b) of section 178 of the 
Restatement of Restitution. 
"What were the executors supposed to do between the notifi-
cation by [the wife] that she claimed the proceeds and the 
bringing of her action to enforce her claim [a period of two 
years]?,,3 was the rhetorical proposition of the majority. The 
dissenting judge answered readily, "The executors would have 
been well advised . . . to have filed in the probate pro-
ceedings a petition for instructions."4 Interpleader might 
also have been an answer. 
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 720, 65 Cal. Rptr. 4. 257 Cal. App.2d at 729, 65 Cal. 
624 (1968). Rptr. at 629. 
3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 727, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. at 628. 
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Remedies for Injuries to Intangible Property Interests 
Security Interests-Damages 
The measure of damages for negligently causing the loss 
of a security interest accompanying a promissory note is 
obviously the difference in value between a secured and un-
secured note. For purposes of computation, what is the value 
of a real property purchase money note in California, given 
the effect of the anti-deficiency statute?5 In Howe v. City 
Title Insurance Co.s the plaintiff had a junior trust deed 
secured by such a note. However, the note was guaranteed. 
The defendant negligently failed to record a request for notice 
of default and sale under a prior trust deed, with the result 
that plaintiff's security interest was wiped out on foreclosure 
since he was denied an opportunity to cure the default. The 
property was sufficiently valuable to cover the plaintiff's junior 
lien, so the secured value of the note was its face value. The 
unsecured note was deemed valueless because of the anti-
deficiency statute, despite the guaranty. The court pointed 
out that the guarantor and his wife were having trouble meet-
ing payments on two other trust deeds and that the guarantor 
had an unsatisfied judgment for $6,000 against him outstand-
ing. This evidence sufficed to establish uncollectibi1ity with-
out the necessity of suing on the guaranty to establish dam-
ages. 7 
Business Interests-Trade Secrets and Trade Names 
The cases decided in 1968 added little that is worthy of 
extensive note on the protection of interests in trade secrets and 
names, afforded by either equity decrees or damages. In King 
v. Pacific Vitamin Corp.s equitable relief against a wholesale 
drug salesman and a competing employer who hired him 
from plaintiff's employ was denied because the salesman's 
5. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580b. 
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 85, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
119 (1967). 
7. For a discussion of restitutionary 
considerations in respect to security in-
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486 (1967). 
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activities did not rise to the level of protectibility encompassed 
by the so-called "route" cases in which employees operate 
routes for customers whom they supply with such things as 
laundry and linens, ice, bread, milk. In Diodes, Inc. v. 
Franzen,9 demurrers to the third amended complaint were 
sustained for inadequate pleading; the plaintiff was unable 
to state other than conclusionary facts concerning alleged 
"secret processes" or to aver with particularity special dam-
ages, in the nature of loss of profits or goodwill (or the casual 
connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's loss), 
sufficient to support a count of unfair competition. 
The court of appeaFo reversed a trial court decision granting 
equitable protection to the name "Look" on a magazine-the 
defendant was publishing a magazine called Nude Look-be-
cause the established facts did not indicate consumer con-
fusion. Apart from the economic aspects, it is difficult to 
say whether the plaintiff publishers should be flattered or 
unflattered by the bit of modern social commentary implicit in 
this decision. 
Remedies for Wrongful Death 
The mitigating effect of the remarriage of a widow on 
whose behalf a wrongful death action has been brought was 
raised in two cases in 1968, Cherrigan v. City and County of 
San Franciscoll and Barth v. B. F. Goodrich CO. 12 In both, 
evidence of the remarriage was held to be properly excluded, 
and in Cherrigan it was further held that the widow could not 
be compelled to amend her complaint so as to reveal her cur-
rent married name. Also in Cherrigan, that the co-plaintiff, 
a minor child, was conceived before marriage was also with-
held from the jury. The unfavorable attitude toward this 
type of mitigating evidence stems from Benwell v. Dean.13 
9. 260 Cal. App.2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
19 (1968). 
10. Cowles Magazine & Broadcast-
ing, Inc. v. Elysium, Inc., 255 Cal. App. 
2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1967). 
11. 262 Cal. App.2d 643, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 42 (1968). 
5 
12. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
306 (1968). For further discussion of 
this case, see Moreau, TORTS, in this 
volume. 
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 345, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 394 (1967). 
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Any distinction between the "possibility" and the "fact" of the 
widow's remarriage is openly rejected in California. The 
rationale is that the evidence is speculative in either case and 
the evidence of actual remarriage removes speculation only as 
to the event and not as to the mitigating consequences. How-
ever, the court in Cherrigan tolerated the testimony of a pro-
fessional sociologist in response to hypothetical questions re-
garding the probable success or failure of the plaintiff's 
marriage to the decedent, taking into consideration such 
factors as age, length of acquaintance, disparity of religious 
faith, premarital sexual relations, stability of parents' mar-
riages. The estimated failure rate according to this witness 
was 25 percent in the United States, 50 percent in California, 
and 70 percent in Marin County. To a layman, it might ap-
pear unrealistic to regard the projections of a sociologist as to 
the future success of an abruptly terminated 35-day marriage 
as less speculative, relative to the pecuniary loss to the widow, 
than the uncontrovertible fact of her present remarriage. 
Perhaps it would be more logical to consider the California 
exclusionary rule of the widow's remarriage as simply an appli-
cation of the "collateral source" rule of tort damages in a 
wrongful death case. As a sidelight, the defendant in Cherri-
gan presented an affidavit by a juror that the sum awarded 
had not been discounted to present value, but the court re-
fused to permit the verdict to be impeached in this fashion. 
Barth makes it clear that a product liability case falls under 
the terms of the California wrongful death statute. The point 
is important in respect to the defense of contributory negli-
gence. Although liability based purely on contract has been 
held not to support a wrongful death action,14 it has been 
recognized for some years that liability for breach of warranty 
is covered by this state's wrongful death act.15 Some authority 
to the contrary exists elsewhere, but the Barth holding as to 
strict liability of manufacturers is in accord with the recognized 
trend. 
14. Moxon v. Kern County, 233 Cal. 15. Hinton v. Republic Aviation 
App.2d 393, 43 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1965). Corp., 180 F.Supp. 31 (1959), 
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Deceit-Damages 
Remedies 
The "out of pocket" rule measuring damages for deceit 
(section 3343 of the Civil Code) was applied in Ach v. Finkel-
stein16 in such a way as to display the inherent unwieldiness 
of the computation of damages under that rule-it is even 
worse under the "benefit of the bargain" rule-when the trans-
action involves large total sums as compared to the amount 
of damage actually resulting. The plaintiffs paid $350,000 
for rental properties, being given the false impression that the 
units were under 12-month leases, whereas in fact rental 
concessions had been granted. As a practical matter this 
compelled further concessions reducing anticipated income. 
To apply the out-of-pocket rule it was deemed necessary to 
determine the actual value of the apartment house. Various 
appraisals were introduced in evidence. One defendant said 
$374,650; another, about $370,000. One of defendant's 
experts estimated $360,000. A second gave $346,500 to 
$356,500 on a market data and comparative approach. He 
also stated $337,960 on an income evaluation approach and 
the fair market value approach. Plaintiffs' expert appraised 
the property at $275,000 on the market data approach, 
$278,750 on the cost approach, and $273,500 on the income 
approach. The trial court, without a jury, decided on 
$340,000, an amount to which no one had testified, and 
awarded $10,000 damages, which was affirmed on appeal. 
The case illustrates how pointless it is to require a jury or 
judge to wrestle with wildly discrepant estimates amounting to 
over a third of a million dollars, when the true focus should 
be the deficiencies in represented income, amounting to but a 
relatively few thousand dollars. 
Fraud-Rescission-A llowable Delay 
In Wilke v. Coinway, Inc.17 plaintiffs were induced by mis-
representations of income potential to purchase some coin-
16. 264 Cal. App.2d -,70 Cal. Rptr. 17. 257 Cal. App.2d 126, 64 Cal. 
472 (1968). Rptr. 845 (1967). 
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operated machines intended to test the operator's reflexes. 
One of the defendant's contentions was that the plaintiffs' 
reaction time was a bit slow insofar as rescission requirements 
are concerned. It took five months before the lack of income 
potential was discovered, four months before an attorney 
was consulted, and another month before action was taken. 
The plaintiffs' delay was held not to be undue since there was 
no indication of prejudice. Plaintiffs' case was bolstered by 
the recognition of their inexperience and credulity. In passing 
it might be pointed out that whether or not the defendant is 
prejudiced by the delay is only one factor; the other concerns 
whether the delay is, in fact, an election by plaintiffs to affirm. 
Fraud in Secured Land Sale Transactions-The Rele-
vance of the Anti-Deficiency Statutes to the Remedy 
A way may exist around the provisions of section 580d of 
the Code of Civil Procedure barring a deficiency judgment on 
a secured note after a private sale of the property at which the 
security holder purchased. The way, given the requisite sup-
porting evidence, is to rescind the promissory note for the 
borrower's fraudulent representations of the nature or value of 
the security. IS Thus the lender may recover the full amount 
of the loan on a restitutionary theory, plus consequential dam-
ages which include prior litigation expenses including attor-
ney's fees. Likewise, the single action statute is no bar. 
A more perplexing situation confronted the defrauded lender 
in American Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Leeds. l9 Here the 
lender advanced $85,000, secured by a trust deed, against the 
purchase price of $122,500 of a house falsely represented by 
the seller to be on unfilled ground. Both the lender and buyer 
were victims of the fraud. The house collapsed. The security 
was deemed worthless or close to it. 
The buyer sued the seller and reached a settlement for an 
unknown sum; the lender was excluded from these negotia-
tions. The lender thereupon brought the present action to 
recover the entire amount of the purchase money loan and to 
18. See Kass v. Weber, 261 Cal. App. 19. 68 Cal.2d 611. 68 Cal. Rptr. 453, 
2d 417, 67 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1968). 440 P.2d 933 (1968). 
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subject to a trust in its favor the moneys (whatever sum this 
might be) rebated by the seller to the defendant-buyer. (The 
seller was originally made a party, but disappeared from the 
proceedings-probably to reappear in separate litigation.) 
Plaintiff relied on provisions in the trust deed that the de-
fendant "keep the property in good condition and repair" and 
give the lender a right to any award for physical damage 
to the property. A demurrer was sustained by the trial court 
whose ruling was upheld at all appellate levels. The reason-
ing was that the provisions in the trust deed with respect to 
repair were applicable only to damage to the property after 
the loan was consummated, rather than to this situation, where 
the security was inadequate at the time the loan was made. 
The anti-deficiency statute20 precludes shifting the loss of the 
inadequate security to the buyer under these circumstances 
by prohibiting his being compelled to pay over sums recovered 
in settlement of his fraud action. According to the supreme 
court the sums recovered were for personal economic loss 
suffered by reason of the deceit. The court conceded, how-
ever, that had the buyer received the entire purchase price, 
there would obviously have been unjust enrichment at the 
lender's expense; since there was no allegation that the buyer 
had settled for more than his own damages, the demurrer was 
properly sustained. 
The decision is not wholly convincing, to the extent the 
result leaves the impression that the anti-deficiency statute-
of questionable merit anyway-is being used not merely to 
bar the purchase money lender from enforcing a deficiency, 
but from asserting its proper prior claim to the security, or 
substitute therefore, itself. Justice Mosk, the lone dissenter, 
among all the appellate justices who reviewed the matter, 
perceived this essential point: "This is not a suit upon a 
secured debt, but a suit to prevent security from being im-
paired."! The anti-deficiency statute was irrelevant. In fact, 
the express provision in the trust deed relating to the restora-
tion of the property could likewise be irrelevant. If the bor-
20. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580b. 1. 68 Cal.2d at 617,68 Cal. Rptr. at 
458, 440 P.2d at 938. 
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rower cannot impair the lender's security, he cannot pocket 
a part of the fund which stands in place of the secured prop-
erty in the face of the lender's prior claim thereto. 
If the court in this case took a wrong turn, it was where it 
assumed that the settlement received by the defendant-buyer 
from the fraudulent seller was compensation for the buyer's 
personal economic loss arising from the fraud rather than an 
injury to the property. Granted that a fraud claim is "per-
sonal," the proposition still seems misleading. The deceit 
directly affected the combined interests of lender and borrower 
in property with respect to which the lender was given by 
contract certain special protection. In lieu of the property 
the seller was under a duty to make restitution of the pur-
chase price or pay compensatory damages represented by the 
difference between the purchase price and the actual value. 
Any moneys advanced against either of these obligations clear-
ly replaced the claimants' rights in the secured property. There 
were no separate personal claims here, but only a single 
property invasion claim with separate priorities. Since the 
borrower's rights to such money was not "personal" to him, 
his diversion of the substitute for the security was inconsistent 
with the lender's priority. It follows that the lender had a prior 
claim to any settlement by the seller with the buyer, until the 
loan would be repaid. The anti-deficiency statute would corne 
into play only to bar the lender from holding the borrower per-
sonally liable for any sum by which the settlement fell short 
of the loan. 
The possibility of unjust enrichment resulting from a settle-
ment whose amount is unknown and from which the party 
with a primary property claim is excluded is too strong to 
leave the case dangling on a demurrer. Section 580b is a 
bar to a deficiency decree, not a means to obtain unjust en-
richment. 
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Remedies for Mistake 
Mistaken Boundaries 
Relocation of a boundary line was achieved in Roman v. 
Ries2 by a qualified decree in a quiet title suit. Defendant 
had acquired property adjacent to that later acquired by 
plaintiff. There was some doubt as to the boundary, defend-
ant relying on the line pointed out by plaintiff's predecessor 
who acquiesced in defendant's improvements up to the sup-
posed line. Following plaintiff's acquisition it was discovered 
that defendant's house was partially over the agreed boundary. 
Plaintiff sued to quiet title, but judgment was entered for the 
defendant under the doctrine of "agreed boundaries," which 
in effect awarded him all the land up to the mistaken line. 
On appeal, this decree was modified. It was pointed out that 
the defendant had changed his position in reliance on the 
"agreed boundary" with respect to only a part of the included 
land and that the remaining portion should therefore be ex-
cluded and part of the boundary re-established along the true 
line. The court admitted there was no precedent for a decree 
which allows a party to benefit from part, but not all, of an 
agreed boundary, but it held that such a decree is within the 
flexible jurisdiction of an equity tribunal. 
Mistake-Restitution 
The court in E. A. Robey & Co. v. City Title Ins. Co.s ap-
plied the rule that a purchaser who has paid for, but has not 
received, the entire amount called for in the contract, is en-
titled to keep what he has received and to have restitution 
of his overpayment.4 The rule is subject to the provision that 
a fair basis for valuation can be found. Applied to the situa-
tion where there is a mistake as to the existence of a grantor's 
title to a portion of the property, the remedy of partial resti-
tution may prove a desirable alternative to rescission or to the 
contract measure of damages stated in section 3306 of the 
2. 259 Cal. App.2d 65,66 Cal. Rptr. 3. 261 Cal. App.2d 517, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
120 (1968). 38 (1968). 
4. Restatement of Restitution § 225. 
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Civil Code, limiting recovery to the price paid and the ex-
penses of examining title plus interest. 
Mistake in Integration-Insurance Policy 
An incontestibility clause does not bar an insurance com-
pany's remedy to reform a policy containing a clerical error. 
So held the court in Schaefer v. California-Western States Life 
Ins. Co. s 
Remedies for Breach of Contract 
Contracts for the Sale of Realty-Vendee in Default 
After resolving a question as to whether a particular trans-
action was a license or sale and deciding in favor of the latter, 
the court in Goetzke v. Hanks6 held that the vendor had several 
remedies but that unlawful detainer was not one of them. 
The rule of Freedman v. Rector, etc. of St. Mathias Parish,7 
allowing restitution in favor of a defaulting vendee for pay-
ments made beyond damages inflicted by the breach will not 
be extended, according to the decision in Smith v. Allen,S to 
allow restitution in favor of a defaulting grantee after a fore-
closure of a purchase money trust deed by a sale at which the 
grantor bids in the property. An opinion of the appellate 
court to the contrary that would have seriously disrupted the 
system of trust deed financing was thus overturned. 
In Butcher v. Dauz,9 a vendee, awarded $6,000 damages 
from a trial on a complaint for specific performance or dam-
ages, suffered a reversal on appeal because of his nonperform-
ance of conditions. Retention of the award as restitution for 
benefits conferred in attempting to perform could not be 
asserted on appeal, because the complaint was framed solely 
on damages for breach of contract, and the issue of' unjust 
enrichment was not presented at trial. 
5. 261 Cal. App.2d 840, 69 Cal. 8. 68 Cal.2d 93, 65 Cal. Rptr. 153, 
Rptr. 183 (1968). 436 P.2d 65 (1968). 
6. 261 Cal. App.2d 615, 68 Cal. Rptr. 9. 257 Cal. App.2d 524, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
150 (1968). 166 (1967). 
7. 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 31 
A.L.R.2d 1 (1951). 
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Vendee in Default-Specific Performance-Mutuality 
The defense of want of mutuality of remedy was unsuccess-
fully asserted by a vendee to a suit for specific performance 
in Landis v. Blomquist. 10 The contract called for part of the 
purchase price to be in the form of a note secured by property, 
acceptable to the vendor outside of the escrow. Defendant 
failed to deposit such a note. The vendee's contention was 
that because of the reservation by the vendor of the right of 
approval of the security, the vendee could not have compelled 
specific performance by the vendor (section 3386, Civil Code). 
The primary reason for the court's rejection of the defense was 
that the mutuality rule is not applicable where the unavail-
ability of the remedy is the result of the defendant's own 
omission. Also, the fact that the vendors instituted the present 
suit cured any want of mutuality of obligation and placed 
them within the jurisdiction of the court, so performance of 
any protective conditions could be assured. The decision 
indicates an unwillingness to indulge in an overly technical 
application of the much criticized mutuality of remedy rule 
III California. 
Contracts for the Sale of Chattels-Damages-Lost 
Profits 
Applying the proposition tha damages based on a difference 
between the contract price and the market price do not ade-
quately compensate a known middleman, who is contem-
plating a profit, the court in Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. A. 
1. Industries, Inc. l1 awarded the plaintiff, a salvage operator 
interested in dismantling the famous Alaska-Juneau mine 
equipment for resale, damages based on lost profits. 
The element of "lost net profits" was also prominent in 
the determination of damages in Dallman Co. v. Southern 
Heater CO. 12 The defendant, a manufacturer, agreed to sell 
10. 257 Cal. App.2d 533. 64 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968). Another 1968 case 
Rptr. 865 (1967). discussing recovery of "lost profits" is 
11. 264 Cal. App.2d -, 70 Cal. Macmorris Sales Corp. v Kozak, 263 
Rptr. 787 (1968). Cal. App.2d 430. 69 Cal. Rptr. 719. 
12. 262 Cal. App.2d 582, 68 Cal. which involved the breakup of a newly 
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large quantities of hot water heaters bearing plaintiff's private 
brand name to the plaintiff, a major plumbing distributor. 
Much of the plaintiff's business was with housing develop-
ers; individual installations carried warranties to the pur-
chaser of each home. The agreement also provided that the 
defendant-manufacturer would establish and maintain a num-
ber of service facilities close to several of the plaintiff's places 
of business in northern California. Defendant's failure of 
performance inevitably caused homeowner dissatisfaction 
which in turn caused the major subdividers and builders to 
cease doing business with plaintiff. The complaint was for 
loss of business profits and goodwill; it resulted in a judgment 
for $262,870. 
On appeal, among other objections, defendant contended 
that the lower court entered a finding of fact that the damages 
represented lost "net profits" and were thus inconsistent with 
the claim for "loss of customers and business good will." 
The appellate court refused to make any distinction between 
the two. Another objection concerned the introduction of 
evidence with regard to gross profits, coupled with testimony 
of plaintiff's president that there was little change in over-
head expenses such as salaries, accounting, rents and sales 
costs after plaintiff's breach. Again the appellate court re-
fused the objection. It cited several California cases holding 
that, although gross profits are not generally recoverable in 
breach of contract actions, in some circumstances, where 
plaintiff can show his operating expenses are fixed and un-
affected by the contract breach, his showing of diminished 
gross profits is permissible since they are the equivalent of 
the diminished net profits caused by the breach. 
Contracts for the Sale of Stock-Specific Performance 
A somewhat novel substitutional decree was entered in 
Lister v. Sorge. 13 The plaintiff sought specific performance of 
formed venture in the used car business. for the reversal of an award of dam-
The usual weakness of the evidence as ages. 
to lost profits where there has been no 13. 260 Cal. App.2d 333, 67 Cal. 
past experience was one of the reasons Rptr. 63 (1968). 
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a stock option offered by a management group to induce him, 
as a former president, to return to active participation in the 
business. During the pendency of the proceedings (which also 
involved reformation of the option to include stock in a 
subsidiary), the corporation sold all its assets. In lieu of the 
stock subject to option defendant now held shares in another 
corporation, plus some promissory notes received in the course 
of the liquidation of the subsidiary. The court ordered the 
substituted property transferred. Probably the circumstances 
justified this admittedly unusual decree, although it might be 
pointed out that the usual basis for equitable jurisdiction to 
compel delivery of stock disappears when the specific stock is 
not available. 
Construction Contracts 
In prolonged litigation the accumulation of claim items such 
as costs, attorney's fees and interest may become as important 
financially as compensatory damages themselves. Some guide-
lines as to these items were laid down in Distefano v. Hall,14 
a case centering upon a dispute over the construction of a 
22-unit apartment house in Santa Clara. The dispute re-
sulted in two trials and a trip to the appellate court. Defenses 
of fraud and faulty construction were vigorously presented. 
The final judgment was $12,560 in favor of the plaintiff. 
- The Problem of Costs 
To encourage settlements, section 997 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that a defendant may make an offer of 
settlement any time before judgment. If not accepted, the 
offer is considered withdrawn and cannot be introduced in 
evidence. However, if the plaintiff refuses the offer and then 
fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover 
costs and must pay defendant's costs from the time of the 
offer. In Distefano, defendant had made an offer of settle-
ment for $20,000; since the judgment was for $12,560, he 
14. 263 Cal. App.2d 380, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 691 (1968). 
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argued that he should be awarded costs. However, the de-
fendant had made a later offer of settlement for only $10,000. 
Applying elementary contract law, the court held that the 
later offer extinguished the prior one and therefore affirmed 
denial of costs to the defendant. 
- The Problem of Attorneys' Fees 
In Distefano, the plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees under 
the contract's boilerplate provision, that in case of suit, "the 
losing party shall pay to the successful party . . , reason-
able attorneys' fees.,,15 Defendant claimed such fees for him-
self pointing out that the plaintiff's original claim for $128,458 
was scaled down to $39,382 by the second trial and resulted 
in a judgment of only $12,560. Thus, on an absolute scale 
the defendants were as successful as the plaintiff. The court 
rejected this contention and held that the successful party 
was the one with the net judgment, even if the other was, in 
a sense, successful in securing a judgment on a counterclaim. 
- The Problem of Pre-Judgment Interest 
Pre-judgment interest is recoverable when the sum due is as-
certained or ascertainable.16 Plaintiff cited authority that the 
sum is ascertainable if a plaintiff has furnished a defendant 
with data from which the amount due can be calculated, even 
allowing for disputes as to agreed price. Plaintiff asserted that 
ten years earlier he had turned over all payroll receipts, in-
voices, and cancelled checks in his possession. The court, 
however, held that the mere fact that defendant was given such 
data was not enough to impose pre-judgment interest; major 
issues of law as well as fact could be determined only by 
trial. This conclusion suggests that pre-judgment interest 
allowance remains largely a matter of judicial discretion but 
that the award depends less on the precision of factual data 
available than on the complexity of the legal issues pre-
sented. 
15. 263 Cal. App.2d at 385, 69 Cal. 16. Cal. Civ. Code § 3287. 
Rptr. at 695-696. 
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Contracts for Services-Real Estate Brokers 
How exclusive is an "exclusive and irrevocable listing" with 
a real estate agent? Not very, if the agent fails to produce 
"lookers." In such event the owner is entitled to rescind or 
cancel the listing for failure of consideration, according to 
Coleman v. Mora. 17 Under the circumstances it was deemed 
unnecessary to distinguish between an "exclusive agency" 
and an "exclusive right to sell," since the property was prompt-
ly resold through another agent rather than by the owner him-
"elf. 
Contracts of Guaranty-Effect of Anti-Deficiency Statute 
A lender whose action against the borrower on a secured 
note is affected by anti-deficiency legislation may gain an 
additional remedy by having the note guaranteed by a third 
party. This device has certain limitations as indicated in 
Union Bank v. Gradsky,I8 wherein the lender first held a non-
judicial sale of the security and then sued the guarantor of 
the note for the deficiency. It was held that by electing to 
proceed in this fashion, the lender had destroyed the guaran-
tor's right of subrogation against the principal obligor, and his 
remedy against the guarantor on the note was barred. 
Contracts to Insure-Breach of Agreement to Obtain 
Insurance 
Subrogation principles also have an effect upon available 
remedies against one who has broken a contract to obtain 
insurance covering a loss subsequently incurred by the plain-
tiff. 
It is generally held in the United States that an insurer may 
not have subrogation to contract claims that the insured might 
otherwise assert to obtain reimbursement for his loss. This 
rule is simply the other side of the coin expressing the rule 
which considers collateral sources in fixing compensatory 
17. 263 Cal. App.2d 137, 69 Cal. 64 (1968). For further discussion of 
Rptr. 166 (1968). this case, see Lazerow, REAL PROPERTY, 
18. 265 Cal. App.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. in this volume. 
CAL LAW 1969 77 
41
York: Remedies
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Remedies 
damages. Application of these principles determined the 
outcome in Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Con-
struction Co.l9 The general contractor (Simpson) agreed to 
obtain fire insurance covering the subcontractor's (Patent) 
work and materials at the job site. Simpson broke the con-
tract. Fire loss occurred and Patent's own insurers paid. 
The present action was brought nominally by Patent for 
breach of contract, but it was openly stated that the genuine 
plaintiffs were Patent's insurers. Judgment given in favor of 
Patent was reversed on appeal. It was reasoned that, since 
Patent had already received payment for its loss, it sustained 
no damage by reason of defendant's breach of contract and 
that there was consequently no cause of action. In other 
words, Patent's insurers were not subrogated to the claim 
for breach of contract. The payment by one of two parties 
contractually bound to indemnify does not create a superior 
equity in favor of the paying as against the non-paying in-
demnitor so as to create an equitable right of subrogation for 
unjust enrichment. 
Stated conversely in terms of the "collateral source" doc-
trine, the result here was that a tortfeasor is not entitled to 
credit for a property insurer's payment of a loss to the plain-
tiff, but that a contract breaker who fails to provide the 
agreed protection against fire loss is entitled to the benefit of 
the plaintiff's fire insurance. 
Remedies on Contracts Nominally Unenforceable Because of 
the Statute of Frauds 
In California, the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute 
of frauds is routinely employed to allow recovery of damages 
for breach of contract, as well as the remedies of restitution or 
specific performance in equity to which a plaintiff may be 
limited in less permissive jurisdictions.20 However, this es-
toppel is not created by a mere promise to put the contract 
19. 256 Cal. App.2d 506, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 187 (1967). 
20. E.g., Dallman Co. v. Southern 
Heater Co., 262 Cal. App.2d 582, 68 
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Cal. Rptr. 873 (1968); Macmorris Sales 
Corp. v. Kozak, 263 Cal. App.2d 430, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 719 (I968). 
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in writing. 1 Also, as to certain agreements (notably that of 
employment of brokers in real estate sales) the contract is 
absolutely unenforceable unless in writing; not even a quasi-
contractual remedy for the reasonable value of the services 
rendered in reliance on the oral agreement is maintainable.2 
In Porporato v. Devincenzi,3 a typical case of an oral 
agreement to devise realty, the plaintiff successfully pursued 
the remedy of quasi-specific performance in lieu of the reme-
dies of restitution or damages. 
1. Tomlins v. American Insurance 256 Cal. App.2d 552, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
Co., 258 Cal. App.2d 525, 66 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1967). 
n (1968). 3. 261 Cal. App.2d 670, 68 Cal. 
2. Wm. E. Doud & Co. v. Smith, Rptr. 210 (1968). 
* 
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